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INDEPENDENT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, GOOD FAITH,




Benchmark Capital (hereinafter Benchmark) ensured its position
among the elite venture capital firms in Silicon Valley when it made
one of the most storied venture capital investments ever: a $5 million
investment in eBay that ultimately returned more than $4 billion.'
Benchmark also drew attention in 1999, when it raised the enormous
sum of $1 billion for a single venture capital fund.2 But its most last-
ing impression on venture capital investing may be the result of a
lawsuit that Benchmark filed against one of its portfolio companies,
as well as that company's founders, officers, directors, and one of its
other investors. In Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague,
3
the Delaware Court of Chancery considered Benchmark's claim that
it was entitled to veto a merger constructed for the sole purpose of
stripping bargained-for rights and preferences from two series of pre-
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Special thanks to Neil Ko-
mesar for interesting and helpful discussions of comparative institutional analysis, to Masako
Ueda for useful conversations about incomplete contracts, and to Larry Hamermesh for in-
sights about the doctrine of independent legal significance. Thanks to Christina Fredette for
excellent research assistance.
1. Russ Mitchell, Too Much Ventured, Nothing Gained, FORTUNE, Nov. 25, 2002, at
135. Benchmark has had other successes, including 1-800-Flowers, Ariba, Handspring, and
Red Hat Software. It also has had some spectacular flops, most notably WebVan. One of its
most discussed investments was Loudcloud, Inc., which changed its name to Opsware, Inc. in
2002. Loudcloud was Marc Andreesson's effort to follow his success with Netscape.
2. George Anders et al., Digits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1999, at B6. At the time, some
people viewed billion-dollar funds as a symbol of elite status. See, e.g., Lawrence Aragon,
Benchmark Forms Billionaire Boys Club, RED HERRING, Sept. 15, 1999. Three years later,
however, Benchmark decided to allow investors in the fund to opt out of capital calls because
Benchmark lacked adequate investment opportunities. See Ann Grimes, Venture Capital Had
a Meager Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at R4.
3. No. CIV.A.19719, 2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002).
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ferred stock owned by Benchmark.4 The case ultimately was decided
on the basis of the arcane doctrine of independent legal significance,
which is described below.5 The court did not mention the contractual
duty of good faith, and this Article explores the intersection of this
duty and the doctrine of independent legal significance in the context
of venture capital contracts.
The proposed merger at issue in Benchmark had been originated
by Juniper Financial Corporation, a credit card issuer based in Dela-
ware, and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Juniper's
largest investor.6 The primary purpose of the merger, described in
more detail below, 7 was to amend Juniper's certificate of incorpora-
tion, creating a new series of preferred stock with priority over the
preferred stock owned by Benchmark. 8 CIBC intended to purchase
shares of the new series of preferred stock, and Benchmark -a mi-
nority investor in Juniper-wanted to prevent the transaction. 9
Until the late 1800s, most corporation statutes in the United
States required the unanimous consent of stockholders to authorize a
merger. 10 While protective of minority stockholders, this rule had a
disabling effect on many corporations and gave minority stockholders
enormous clout by permitting holdups." Gradually, state legislatures
changed the voting rules for mergers, initially requiring a supermajor-
ity vote and later allowing for majority rule. 12 Thus the modem rule
for voting on mergers attempts to balance the legitimate interests of
the majority stockholders in flexible administration of the firm against
the legitimate interests of the minority stockholders in protecting their
4. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently affirmed "on the basis of and for the
reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery in its opinion." Benchmark Capital Partners IV,
L.P. v. Juniper Financial Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003).
5. See infra Part II.
6. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *1.
7. See infra Part I.
8. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *1; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(e)
(2003) ("In the case of a merger, the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation
shall automatically be amended to the extent, if any, that changes in the certificate of incorpo-
ration are set forth in the agreement of merger.").
9. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *1-*2.
10. Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Cor-
porate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1995).
11. Id at 13 ("Any one shareholder could hold up a beneficial change or force the en-
terprise to reassemble the financial investors in a new venture with the attendant costs that
would drain money from the evolving business.").
12. William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69 (1980).
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investment.' 3 Absent contractual override, these voting rules would
enable Juniper and CIBC to pursue the merger transaction without in-
terference from Benchmark because CIBC controlled a majority of
the votes.14
Presumably recognizing its Vulnerability under the applicable le-
gal rules, Benchmark bargained for additional protection against pref-
erence stripping. 15 This bargained-for protection took the form of a
contract provision prohibiting corporate actions that "materially ad-
versely change the rights, preferences and privileges" of the Series A
or Series B Preferred Stock.' 6 Unfortunately for Benchmark, this pro-
tective provision did not perform up to expectations. Benchmark ar-
gued that this provision allowed them to thwart any transaction that
impaired their stock, including the proposed merger.' 7  In response,
Juniper and CIBC observed that the language of the contract was
similar (though not identical) to the language of § 242(b) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, which describes the procedure
for amending the charter outside the context of a merger. Juniper and
CIBC argued that the similarity between the contract and the statute
suggested that the drafters of the contract intended to allow Bench-
mark to veto charter amendments but not mergers.' 8  The court
agreed:
Where the drafters have tracked the statutory language relating to
charter amendments in 8 Del. C. § 242(b), courts have been reluc-
tant to expand those restrictions to encompass the separate process
of merger as set forth in 8 Del. C. § 251, unless the drafters have
made clear the intention to grant a class vote in the context of a
merger. 19
In short, the court held that (1) the harm to Benchmark was
caused by the merger, not by a charter amendment, and (2) Bench-
13. In addition to the right to vote, minority stockholders have the right to receive an
appraisal of the value of their shares. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2003).
14. CIBC and Benchmark both held shares of preferred stock in Juniper. In this in-
stance, both CIBC and Benchmark were entitled to vote by virtue of voting rights specified in
Juniper's corporate charter. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *3; see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 251 (requiring a majority vote of "the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to
vote" on the merger).
15. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *3-*4 (Benchmark sought to ensure that Juniper
did not issue any additional equity security that would be senior to the shares owned by
Benchmark.).
16. Id. at *4.
17. Id. at *2, *5.
18. Id. at *6.
19. Id. at *7.
WILLAMETTE LAWREVIEW
mark had no separate voting rights-either by statute or by contract-
with respect to the merger.20 This result reflects the workings of the
doctrine of independent legal significance, which holds that a transac-
tion structured in compliance with one section of the Delaware corpo-
ration statute is valid, even if it leads to a substantive result that would
not be allowed by another section of the statute.2' More particularly
in the context of Benchmark, the merger provision of the Delaware
statute is independent of the provision on charter amendments.
When law students and nonlawyers first encounter cases like
Benchmark, they are often struck by the apparent unfairness of the re-
sult. To the extent that the parties negotiated Benchmark's status,
they explicitly prohibited this sort of preference stripping.22 Unfortu-
nately for Benchmark, the contract was incomplete. It prohibited
preference stripping using language that failed to identify mergers as
the potential mechanism. 23 Had the parties focused on this gap in the
contractual protections, would they would have filled the gap with a
provision that protected Benchmark? The answer to that question is
difficult to know. Nevertheless, the Delaware court appears to be
elevating form over substance in a most dramatic way.
Most lawyers, by contrast to law students and non-lawyers, read-
ily accept the formalism of Benchmark. 4  Lawyers may debate the
wisdom of the doctrine of independent legal significance, but those
debates are rarely cast in terms of fairness. As long as the rules of the
game are stated openly, lawyers are not too concerned by decisions
that enforce those rules strictly. Indeed, given the long line of prece-
dents dealing with exactly this sort of preference stripping, lawyers
might go so far as to assume-contrary to non-lawyers-that the par-
ties to any contract failing to provide for a veto in the event of a char-
ter amendment via merger must have intended implicitly to allow
20. Id. at *9-*10.
21. See, e.g., Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375 (Del. 1963) ("[A]ction taken in accor-
dance with different sections of that law are acts of independent legal significance even though
the end result may be the same under different sections.").
22. See Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *1, *4.
23. Id. at *9.
24. While law students are often taught to view formalism as a sin, it plays an important
role in contemporary law. And while formalism can be difficult to define, the doctrine of in-
dependent legal significance would seem to qualify under any conception of that word. See
Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and Partial Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57,
68 (2003) (citing the doctrine as an example of the proposition that "a rule's addressee may
with impunity circumvent the rule though strict compliance with it, as by engaging in the evil,
or a substantially similar evil, targeted by a rule while nevertheless simultaneously adhering to
the rule").
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such a merger.
But there is the rub: To the extent that there is concern about the
intent of the parties, one must recognize that such intent is not always
readily discernable from the terms of a contract or other communica-
tions. As observed recently by Robert Scott, "All contracts are in-
complete. 2 5 Indeed, people often act in offensive ways that are not
expressly regulated by any legal commands. In resolving contract
disputes, courts rely on the duty of good faith to fill in the gaps in in-
complete contracts.26
This Article begins in Part I with a brief description of the
Benchmark case. Part II describes the origins and development of the
doctrine of independent legal significance and illustrates its role as a
doctrine of judicial abstention. Part III examines the method used by
Delaware courts to interpret the terms of preferred stock agreements.
The interpretive rule of strict construction described in this part com-
bines with the doctrine of independent legal significance to make a
formidable hurdle for holders of preferred stock. Part IV explores the
contract doctrine of good faith, with special attention to the common
law of Delaware, and shows its importance as a doctrine of judicial
intervention. Part V employs comparative institutional analysis27 and
the incomplete contracting theory to examine the appropriate role for
courts in disputes like Benchmark.
I. THE BENCHMARK CASE
In June and August 2000, Benchmark made two investments in
28Juniper. In exchange for $25 million, Benchmark received shares of
Juniper's Series A and Series B Preferred Stock.29 Within months Ju-
niper was back on Benchmark's doorstep, asking for an additional in-
vestment. Benchmark refused, but CIBC agreed to contribute $145
million in exchange for a convertible note worth $27 million and
shares of Series C Preferred Stock, which resulted in CIBC owning a
majority of the voting power in Juniper. In addition, CIBC was enti-
25. Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1641, 1641 (2003).
26. See, e.g., Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991)
("The office of the doctrine of good faith is to forbid the kinds of opportunistic behavior that a
mutually dependent, cooperative relationship might enable in the absence of rule.").
27. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS].
28. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *2.
29. Id.
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tled to elect six of Juniper's eleven directors. 30
As is common in companies that have multiple series of pre-
ferred stock, Juniper's Certificate of Incorporation granted each series
a vote on corporate actions that would "'[m]aterially adversely
change the rights, preferences and privileges"' of the series. 3' In ad-
dition, each series was entitled to a series vote before Juniper could
"'[a]uthorize or issue, or obligate itself to issue, any other equity se-
curity... senior to or on a parity' with the series. 32 When CIBC ne-
gotiated its investment in Series C Preferred Stock, however, it ob-
tained the right to waive these protective provisions,33 as long as the
waiver did not "diminish or alter the liquidation preference or other
financial or economic rights" of the Series A or Series B preferred
stockholders or enable a breach of fiduciary duty.34
In early 2002, Juniper started seeking another round of funding.
The desire for more money was not driven by whim, but rather by the
need to comply with the capital requirements under applicable bank-
ing regulations. 35 After contacting all of its initial investors, Juniper
concluded that CIBC was the only viable option. Juniper wanted
CIBC to invest an additional $50 million, but CIBC was willing to
make that investment only if it could obtain a dividend preference, a
liquidation preference, and certain other rights over the shares of Se-
ries A and Series B Preferred Stock.36 Under the rules of Delaware's
corporation statute, however, such preferences must appear in Juni-
per's Certificate.37 As a result, that Certificate would need to be
amended.
The only problem with this plan was that Benchmark objected to
30. Id.
31. Id. at *4 (quoting Art. IV, § C.4.c of Juniper's Certificate of Incorporation).
32. Id. at *1 (quoting Art. IV, § C.6.a(i) of Juniper's Certificate of Incorporation).
33. Id. at n.4 ("The protective rights at issue here may be waived by a majority vote of a
class consisting of the holders of the Series A, Series B and Series C Preferred shares on an as-
converted to common stock basis. Because of CIBC's holdings of Series C Preferred Stock, it
is able to cast a majority of the votes of this class on its own.").
34. Id. at *1 (quoting Art. IV, § C.4.c of Juniper's Certificate of Incorporation. The
actual waiver provision allowed CIBC to exercise the waiver, unless such action:
[W]ould (a) diminish or alter the liquidation preference or other financial or eco-
nomic rights, modify the registration rights, or increase the obligations, indemnities
or liabilities of the holders of Series A Preferred Stock, Series A Prime Preferred
Stock or Series B Preferred Stock or (b) authorize, approve or waive any action so
as to violate any fiduciary duties owed by such holders under Delaware law.
Id. at *3.
35. Id. at *4.
36. Id. at *4-*5.
37. DGCL § 102(a)(4).
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having its Series A and Series B Preferred Stock subordinated to the
proposed Series D Preferred Stock.38 Even though the contractual
protections described above could be waived by CIBC in some in-
stances, they could not be waived for the purpose of diminishing or
altering Benchmark's dividend preference, liquidation preference, or
other financial rights.
39
Because direct amendment of the Certificate via board and
stockholder approval was impossible, Juniper and CIBC decided to
pursue a different strategy. They used one of the oldest tricks in the
book for stripping rights from preferred stock-a merger. 40 Juniper
formed a wholly-owned subsidiary for the sole purpose of merging it
into Juniper;41 and under the terms of the merger agreement, Juniper
would emerge as the surviving corporation with a restated Certificate
containing all of the terms that would have been contained in an
amended Certificate. 42 Shortly after learning of this proposed transac-
tion, Benchmark sued in the Delaware Court of Chancery and re-
quested that the court issue a preliminary injunction.43
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
The gist of Benchmark's claim was that Juniper and CIBC were
about to violate the provisions of Juniper's charter by diminishing or
altering Benchmark's dividend preference, liquidation preference, and
other rights, albeit through merger rather than through direct charter
38. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *5.
39. Id. at *7.
40. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 936-37 (2002) (describing the process of prefer-
ence stripping through a merger).
41. Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *3. By using a wholly-owned subsidiary, Juni-
per evaded the limitation in the Certificate that gave the Series A and Series B Preferred stock
veto rights whenever Juniper wanted to "'consolidate or merge into any other Corporation
(other than a wholly-owned subsidiary Corporation)"' (quoting Art. IV, § C.6.a(ii) of Juniper's
Certificate of Incorporation).
42. Id. at *5. Pursuant to the merger agreement, the shares of existing Series A and Se-
ries B Preferred Stock would be converted into shares of new Series A and Series B Preferred
Stock. The new shares would have smaller dividend and liquidation preferences and would
have more limited redemption rights. Most importantly, they would be subordinated to the new
Series D Preferred Stock.
In addition to receiving new shares of Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, the hold-
ers of existing Series A and Series B Preferred Stock were to receive a small fraction of a share
of Juniper common stock, a warrant to purchase an additional fraction of a share of Juniper
common stock, and a small amount of cash.
43. Id.
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amendment. 44 This was not the first time such a claim had come be-
fore the Delaware courts, and like prior attempts to invoke the protec-
tions of the courts, Benchmark's claim would ultimately founder on
the doctrine of independent legal significance.
The origins of the doctrine of independent legal significance lie
in the Delaware common law. The doctrine is most commonly asso-
ciated with cases involving claims of de facto merger,45 but it appears
to have originated in cases of rights stripping from preferred stock. In
other words, the origins of the doctrine of independent legal signifi-
cance seem to lie in cases that resemble Benchmark. In this section,
we examine those cases for clues about the rationale for the rule, a ra-
tionale that we will later employ to evaluate the modem usage of the
rule.
We begin our study of the doctrine of independent legal signifi-
cance with de facto mergers, which are reorganizations accomplished
by contract (a series of asset sales and related governance changes),
rather than in accordance with the merger provisions of the state cor-
poration law. In the well-known Pennsylvania case of Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp.,46 for example, two corporations entered into a "reor-
ganization agreement" that required one corporation (List) to sell all
of its assets to the other corporation (Glen Alden).47 In exchange for
the assets, Glen Alden assumed List's liabilities and issued shares of
Glen Alden stock, which were then distributed to List's sharehold-
ers.48 List was subsequently dissolved, and the result was a corpora-
tion (rechristened "List Alden") owned by former shareholders of
Glen Alden and List.49 In other words, this series of transactions pro-
duced a result that was exactly the same as a merger, but the parties
did not comply with the formalities of the merger statute.
The motivation for structuring the reorganization in this way is
clear: Minority shareholders of a Pennsylvania corporation obtained
dissenters' rights-including, most importantly, the right to receive
the appraised value of their shares, rather than the value offered by
the majority shareholders-if the transaction fell within the merger
statute, but they did not receive dissenters' rights for a sale of the cor-
44. Id.
45. Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963).
46. 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958).
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poration's assets. 5° According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the origin of statutory dissenters' rights lie in the common law. More
specifically, in Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R. Co.,5 an 1858 deci-
sion, the Court ordered an appraisal for a minority shareholder in the
absence of a statute.52 The Farris Court reasoned that the modem
statute embraced the rationale of Lauman, which was that minority
shareholders should not be required to continue their relationship with
an entity that has lost its "essential nature and alter[ed] the original
fundamental relationships of the shareholders among themselves and
to the corporation. ' '53 As a result, the Farris Court granted appraisal
rights.54
What is most interesting for the present analysis is that the Far-
ris Court did not betray any awareness that institutions other than the
Court might address the problem of minority rights more effectively.
For example, the defendants offered strong evidence that the Pennsyl-
vania legislature ,had denied appraisal rights for asset-sale transac-
tions, thus overruling some prior cases.55 However, the Court coun-
tered that "divest[ing] shareholders of their right to dissent under such
circumstances would require express language which is absent from
the [statute]. 56 The Court added, "we will not blind our eyes to the
realities of the transaction,, 57 thus justifying a course of judicial inter-
vention.
The Delaware Supreme Court faced this same issue five years
later in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,58 and took the alternate path
of judicial abstention. Hariton involved a reorganization that was
very similar to the transaction in Farris.59 In this instance, however,
50. Id. at 28, 30.
51. 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
52. According to Bayless Manning, this was the first appraisal statute in the United
States. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 246 n.38 (1962). However, Melvin Eisenberg has argued that Ohio enacted
appraisal statutes in 1851 and 1852. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION 75 (1976).
53. Farris, 143 A.2d at 29.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at31.
57. Id.
58. 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). At roughly the same time, the Delaware Supreme Court
was using the doctrine of independent legal significance to decide that a company did not carry
out a de facto merger merely by purchasing the shares of another company. Orzeck v. Engle-
hart, 195 A.2d 375 (Del. 1963).
59. The Delaware Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Heilbrunn v. Sun
Chemical Corp. 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959). In that case, however, the claim to invalidate the
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the Court denied appraisal rights, citing the equal dignity rule:
We now hold that the reorganization here accomplished through
§271 [the asset sale provision] and a mandatory plan of dissolution
and distribution is legal. This is so because the sale-of-assets stat-
ute and the merger statute are independent of each other. They
are, so to speak, of equal dignity, and the framers of a reorganiza-
tion plan may resort to either type of corporate mechanics to
achieve the desired end.60
The Hariton Court was more reflective than the Farris Court
about the institutional impacts of its decision. Responding to the
plaintiff's contention that the Court should grant appraisal rights in
some asset sales but not others, the Court stated that "[t]o attempt to
make any such distinction between sales under § 271 would be to cre-
ate uncertainty in the law and invite litigation.' Standing alone, this
rationale does not travel very far. Every judicial intervention invites
future litigation. The important question is whether such litigation is
worthwhile, and deciding whether litigation is worthwhile requires
more searching consideration of the options 62
The equal dignity rule is also known as the doctrine of independ-
ent legal significance, a term that predates Hariton; it first appeared in
MacCrone v. American Capital Corp.63 The MacCrone Court was
asked to evaluate the fairness of a merger.64 Among other arguments
leveled against the merger was the claim that several of the directors
of the merged company benefited financially from the merger.65 The
Court declined to inquire into the directors' motives, observing that
"the merger is an act of independent legal significance, and the mere
fact that those who initiate it will receive some benefit does not make
it fraudulent., 66 In its initial incarnation, the term "independent legal
significance" might seem to bear little relation to the modern doctrine,
but it is similar in one crucial aspect, namely, that both the MacCrone
Court and the modern doctrine of "independent legal significance"
attempt to draw boundaries around the permissible scope of judicial
transactions was brought by shareholders of the purchasing company. According to the Court,
embracing the reasoning of the Farris court, these shareholders were not "forced to accept
stock in another corporation. Nor has the reorganization changed the essential nature of the
enterprise .... " Id. at 758.
60. 188 A.2d at 125.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part V.
63. 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943).
64. Id. at 464, 466.
65. Id. at 469.
66. Id. at 469-70.
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inquiry. In both contexts, compliance with the merger statute is a
formal requirement that precludes judicial intervention. 67
A more modem use of "independent legal significance" appears
a few years later in Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories.6' The
Langfelder case resembles Benchmark in that it involved a claim by
preferred stockholders who had been victimized by a merger. Prior to
the merger, the preferred stockholders had accrued more than $28,000
in dividends.69 Pursuant to the merger agreement, the old preferred
stock was exchanged for new preferred stock carrying a much smaller
cumulative dividend than the old preferred stock.70  Moreover, the
dividends accrued on the old preferred stock "were wiped out."71
The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to the benefits of a
charter provision that was triggered by a reduction of the preferred
stock of the corporation." 72 Under that provision, the preferred stock-
holders were entitled to receive 110 percent of "the amount of the re-
duction.., and ... all cumulated and unpaid dividends thereon," plus
additional dividends since the last dividend date.73 The question be-
fore the court, therefore, was whether the share exchange accom-
plished pursuant to the merger was a reduction of the preferred
stock.74 Because a merger is of independent legal significance from
the preferred stockholders' contractual rights, the court reasoned that
the exchange did not trigger those rights. 75 Instead the merger "pro-
vides for an exchange of all the old preferred's rights and privi-
leges... for stock in the resultant corporation., 76 The court opined
that the preferred stockholders "ought either to have accepted the pro-
visions of the merger agreement.., or they should have sought an
appraisal."77
Langfelder invoked the term "independent legal significance" as
follows:
67. The MacCrone Court added a telling footnote to its discussion: "May it be said that
if a jural act is lawful, i.e., if the merger is lawful, no one can claim that the motive which gen-
erated it rests on bad faith." MacCrone, 51 F. Supp. at 470 n. 10.
68. 68 F. Supp. 209 (D. Del. 1946), affd, 163 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1947).
69. Id. at 209.
70. Id. at 210.
71. Id.
72 Id.
73. Id. at 209.
74. Id. at 210-11.
75. ld. at 213.
76. Id. at 212.
77. Id.
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[T]he right to be paid in full for [accumulated] dividends, notwith-
standing provisions in the charter contract, may be eliminated by
means of a merger which meets the standard of fairness. The ra-
tionale is that a merger is an act of independent legal significance,
and when it meets the requirements of fairness and all other statu-
tory requirements, the merger is valid and not subordinate or de-
pendent upon any other section of the Delaware Corporation
Law.78
While the phrasing was new, the concept was already well estab-
lished. In Federal United Corp. v. Havender,79 the Delaware Su-
preme Court confronted facts that were very similar to those in Lang-
felder-a merger of a parent corporation with a wholly-owned
subsidiary, having the effect of stripping rights from the preferred
stock. The Court asserted that preferred stockholders with accumu-
lated dividends were not creditors of the corporation "in the ordinary
and usual meaning of the word." 80 As a result, the corporation was
allowed to deprive the preferred stockholders of their accumulated
dividends by virtue of a merger. 81 The justification for this position
was simply that the preferred stockholders knew what they were get-
ting into when they made the investment. 82  As in Langfelder, the
78. Id. at 211.
79. 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
80. Id. at 336.
81. Id. at 343-48. The Court was required to distinguish Keller v. Wilson & Co., which
held that a corporation could not destroy a preferred shareholder's right to accumulated divi-
dends by amending the corporate charter. Keller did not involve an amendment by merger, but
rather an amendment under the amendment section of the DGCL. Id. at 323-34 (citing Keller
v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936)). Bayless Manning commented on the reconciliation
of these two cases:
The court in Havender purported to find other grounds for distinguishing the two
cases, but it paused to note that under the Delaware corporation statute the plaintiff
in Keller did not have the appraisal remedy available to him while the plaintiff in
Havender did. Most observers have felt that this was the key difference ....
Manning, supra note 52, at 228.
82. Havender, I1 A.2d at 333-43.
The shareholder has notice that the corporation whose shares he has acquired may
be merged with another corporation if the required majority of the shareholders
agree. He is informed that the merger agreement may prescribe the terms and con-
ditions of the merger, the mode of carrying it into effect, and the manner of convert-
ing the shares of the constituent corporations into the shares of the resulting corpo-
ration. A well-understood meaning of the word "convert," is to alter in form,
substance or quality. Substantial rights of shareholders, as is well known, may in-
clude rights in respect of voting, options, preferences and dividends. The average
intelligent mind must be held to know that dividends may accumulate on preferred
stock, and that in the event of a merger of the corporation issuing the stock with an-
other corporation, the various rights of shareholders, including the right to dividends
on preference stock accrued but unpaid, may, and perhaps must, be the subject of
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Court relied on appraisal as the fundamental remedy for dissatisfied
preferred shareholders.83
As is clear from this brief history, the doctrine of independent
legal significance was formed in cases involving rights stripping of
preferred stock, like Benchmark. The doctrine has continued to flour-
ish in this setting, but modem application of the doctrine often re-
volves around the merger provision and the amendment provision of
the Delaware corporation law. Delaware corporation law permits
changes to be made to the corporate charter via approval of a merger
agreement by a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation.84
This merger section does not provide for a separate class vote on the
merger agreement, even if the merger agreement adversely affects one
or more classes. This process stands in marked contrast to §
242(b)(2), which governs charter amendments and provides for a
separate class or series vote on any amendment that would "alter or
change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of
[any] class [or series] so as to affect them adversely." 85 The Delaware
courts have consistently held that the merger provision and the
amendment provision of the DGCL have independent legal signifi-
cance.
86
In a modem twist, the Delaware Supreme Court has changed the
doctrine of independent legal significance from a rule of statutory in-
terpretation into a rule of contract interpretation. This transition can
be traced to the important and well-known case of Warner Communi-
reconcilement and adjustment; for, in many cases, it would be impracticable to ef-
fect a merger if the rights attached to the shares could not be dealt with.
Id.
83. Id. at 343 ("The complainants were put to their election, either to demand payment
in money of the value of their preferred shares as agreed upon, or as ascertained by an ap-
praisement, or to accept the exchange of securities offered by the merger plan.").
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (stating that "[t]he [merger] agreement shall
state.., such amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviving cor-
poration as are designed to be effected by the merger ...."). The corporation law adds that
"[i]f a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall be
voted for the adoption of the agreement ... by each constituent corporation, it shall then be
filed and shall become effective...." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c). See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (e) ("In the case of a merger, the certificate of incorporation of the surviving
corporation shall automatically be amended to the extent, if any, that changes in the certificate
of incorporation are set forth in the agreement of merger.").
85. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2).
86. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 845 n.6 (Del. 1998);
Warner Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 583 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd,
567 A.2d 419 (Del. 1989).
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cations Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.87  The plaintiffs in this
case-the parties to the Time-Warner merger agreement-brought
this declaratory judgment action against holders of preferred stock in
Warner, who were asserting veto rights over the merger. 88 The basis
for their assertion of rights was Warner's certificate of designation,
which contained the terms of the preferred stock. That certificate
contained two provisions that, according to the preferred stockhold-
ers, provided veto rights over the merger.89
One provision required the approval of two-thirds of the pre-
ferred stockholders before the company could "alter or change any
rights, preferences or limitations of the Preferred stock so as to affect
the holders of all of such shares adversely." 90 The other provision
prohibited Warner from acting to "amend, alter or repeal any of the
provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation or By-laws of the Cor-
poration so as to affect adversely any of the preferences, rights, pow-
ers or privileges of the Series B Stock or the holders thereof' without
first obtaining the consent of at least two-thirds of the affected share-
holders of then outstanding stock.91 In this instance, the parties stipu-
lated for purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings that the
Series B Preferred Stock of Warner would be adversely affected by
the consummation of the Time-Warner merger, which contemplated
the conversion of those shares into shares of a new series of Time pre-
ferred stock.92  The issue, therefore, was whether that merger trig-
gered either of the protective provisions just described.93
The defendants argued that any corporate action-including a
merger-should be subjected to the two-thirds voting requirement
under the first provision. Chancellor Allen of the Court of Chancery
of Delaware rejected this suggestion, noting "the close similarity be-
tween the operative language of Section 3.3(i) of the corporation's
certificate of designation and Section 242(b)(2) of the General Corpo-
ration Law." 94  From this observation, Chancellor Allen made the
87. 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989).
88. Id. at 963.
89. Id. at 964-65.
90. Id. at 964.
91. Id. at 965.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 965-66.
94. Id. at 969. Section 3.3(i) of the certificate of designation states that "the affirmative
vote of at least two-thirds of the ... outstanding shares of Series B Stock... shall be neces-
sary to alter or change any rights, preferences or limitations of the Preferred Stock so as to
affect the holders of all such stock adversely." Id. Section 242(b)(2) of the General Corpora-
tion Law states that "[t]he holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote
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critical-and, in my view, unjustified-move. Because § 242(b)(2)
does not provide a right to a separate class vote in the event of a
merger, a contract provision whose language resembles § 242(b)(2)
also does not provide such a right. This is, of course, exactly the rea-
soning embraced in Benchmark. Chancellor Allen attempted to con-
nect this reasoning to the drafter's intent. Chancellor Allen concluded
that it was unlikely that the drafters of the charter, being familiar with
corporation law, would have chosen language similar to § 242(b)(2) if
they meant for a merger to trigger a class vote.
95
Underlying this conclusion are two behavioral assumptions
about the predilections of corporate lawyers: (1) that the lawyers who
drafted the terms of Warner's preferred stock would attempt to repli-
cate by contract the protections already provided in the Delaware
statute; and (2) that they would do this by including language that was
only similar-not identical-to the statute. With respect to the first
assumption, I believe that all corporate lawyers would agree that the
practice of replicating statutory provisions in charters and bylaws is
not uncommon. The second behavioral assumption is more contro-
versial. Admittedly, the language at issue in Warner is close to the
language of § 242(b)(2), but why would the drafters not make the
language identical? Corporate lawyers who want to obtain exactly the
protections of the statute know how to accomplish this task--copy the
statute exactly. One needs only read the director exculpatory provi-
sions of a few Delaware corporate charters, which parrot DGCL §
102(b)(7), to realize that corporate law practitioners are fully capable
of copying the statute. Plagiarism is not a concern. They are not in-
terested in paraphrasing. To assume that a drafter who writes some-
thing other than the exact words of the statute, all the while intending
only to incorporate the statute, requires a large leap of faith.
The most important feature of Warner for present purposes is the
influence of the doctrine of independent legal significance on contract
interpretation. By attributing to the drafters of Warner's charter an
intention to emulate § 242(b)(2), Chancellor Allen imposed on the
charter the same limitations that adhere to the statute. In his words:
Our bedrock doctrine of independent legal significance ... com-
pels the conclusion that satisfaction of the requirements of Section
251 is all that is required legally to effectuate a merger. It follows,
as a class upon a proposed amendment... if the amendment would... alter or change the
powers, preferences or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely.
Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2)) (emphasis added)).
95. 583 A.2d at 970..
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therefore, from rudimentary principles of corporation law, that the
language of 242(b)(2), which so closely parallels the language of
3.3(i), does not entitle the holders of a class of preferred stock to a
class vote in a merger, even if (as we assume here) the interests of
the class will be adversely affected by the merger ....
Since I take this legal conclusion to be the general understanding
among corporation law specialists ... I can only conclude that it is
extraordinarily unlikely that the drafters of Section 3.3(i), who ob-
viously were familiar with and probably expert in our corporation
law, would have chosen language so closely similar to that of Sec-
tion 242(b)(2) had they intended a merger to trigger the class vote
mechanism of that section.96
Although Chancellor Allen kept his eye firmly focused on the
drafters' intentions, he took a large step toward importing the doctrine
of independent legal significance from its domain as a rule of statu-
tory interpretation to the realm of contract interpretation. The next
part of this Article explores the means by which the Delaware courts
completed the transformation of that doctrine. The result was that by
the time Benchmark was decided, the Delaware courts had replaced
the emphasis on the drafters' intention with a formal inquiry into
"magic words." Viewed another way, the formalism that lies at the
heart the doctrine of independent legal significance had infected the
interpretation of contracts.
III. THE INTERPRETATION OF PREFERRED STOCK CONTRACTS
The terms regulating preferred stock of Delaware corporations
usually are to be found in a document called the "Certificate of Des-
ignations." Although this document has a physical existence separate
from the Certificate of Incorporation, the two certificates are joined at
the hip, so to speak; together, they comprise the corporation's charter.
When the Delaware courts are asked to interpret corporate char-
ters, the judges approach the documents as contracts. 97 Chancellor
Allen's interpretation of Warner's preferred stock provisions is typi-
cal in that he focused on the drafter's intent. Preferred stock provi-
sions, however, may be burdened by a special interpretive rule that
Chancellor Allen mentioned only in passing: "While the effort is to
arrive at the intended meaning of the words employed, it is generally
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 111, 113 (Del. 2001) ("It is a
fundamental principle that the rules used to interpret statutes, contracts, and other written in-
struments are applicable when construing corporate charters and bylaws.").
[40:825
2004] INTERPRETATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS 841
said that rights or preferences over common stock should be clearly
expressed and not presumed.,
98
The impetus for creating this interpretive rule for preferred stock
is clear. As observed by the Delaware Court of Chancery in an early
preferred stock case, "If you say that the preferred's preferences are
enlarged, as a corollary you must say that the common's burdens are
increased and its rights curtailed." 99 The court conjures an image of
preferred stock investors forcing their will upon the common stock-
holders. This image appears again in another frequent articulation of
the rule: "Because at common law, in the absence of agreement to the
contrary, all shares of stock, by whatever name they may be known,
stand upon an equal footing, preferences, being in derogation of the
common law rule, must be strictly construed."100 As is apparent in
the subsequent discussion, the image of opportunistic preferred stock-
holders continues to, exert a tremendous influence on the Delaware
courts.
The rule of strict construction can be criticized on a number of
grounds. One might argue, as does Professor Bratton in his com-
ments on this Article, that the rule is grounded on a misguided under-
standing of preferred stock investing and that preferred stockholders
tend to be weak bargaining foes. 101 While this is a strong argument in
the context of traditional preferred stock investment, it does not reso-
nate in the venture capital context.
To the extent that the rule emanates from the old legal canon that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be interpreted strictly,
one might argue that legislatures have roundly rejected this ap-
proach. 10 2 In addition, legal scholars since Roscoe Pound have at-
98. 583 A.2d at 967. Chancellor Allen did not rely on this rule for his holding in War-
ner, presumably because he felt that the interpretation was clear.
99. Gaskill v. Gladys Bell Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 340 (Del. Ch. 1929).
100. Goldman v. Postal Tel., 52 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D. Del. 1943).
101. See William W. Bratton, Gaming Delaware, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 853, 858
(2004).
102. See Einer Elhauge, Preference Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REv. 2162, 2268 (2002):
Given that courts have long interpreted ambiguous statutes to further the perceived
legislative intent or purpose, one might have thought that a legislature that preferred
that judges instead interpret all statutory ambiguity narrowly would have enacted an
interpretive statute saying so. In fact, none of the codes of construction enacted by
legislatures within the United States directs a narrow construction of statutory am-
biguities. To the contrary, the state legislatures that have addressed the issue have
expressly rejected the canon providing for narrow construction of statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law.
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tacked that principle of statutory construction as anachronistic and
unnecessary.' 0 3 Use of the principle in the context of preferred stock
seems particularly out of place, because the terms being strictly con-
strued are drafted by private parties, not by a legislature.
While any of these arguments might carry the day, I take a dif-
ferent tack-one more narrowly tailored to the task at hand. In my
view, the interpretive rule of strict construction, when combined with
the doctrine of independent legal significance, unduly impairs the
purported goal of contract interpretation. Two cases illustrate the
combined effect.
The first is Sullivan Money Management, Inc. v. FLS Holdings,
Inc.,10 4 where then Vice-Chancellor Jacobs considered a charter pro-
vision that read as follows:
So long as any shares of the Cumulative Exchangeable Preferred
Stock are outstanding, the Corporation will not, without the af-
firmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the out-
standing shares of Cumulative Exchangeable Preferred Stock, vot-
ing as a class, change, by amendment to the Certificate of
Incorporation of the Corporation or otherwise, the terms and pro-
visions of the Cumulative Exchangeable Preferred Stock so as to
affect adversely the rights and preferences of the holders thereof or
authorize the issuance of any Senior Securities or Parity Securities
or any securities exchangeable or convertible into any Senior Se-
curities or Parity Securities. 105
Unlike the provision at issue in Warner, this provision resembles
§ 242(b)(2) only to the extent that both deal with charter amendments.
The structure of the provision, however, is completely unlike §
242(b)(2). Moreover, this provision includes the pregnant words "or
otherwise," which could be interpreted as an inclusion of changes
other than amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation that require
a vote of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares before a change
103. See John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 120 n.478 (2001) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 379,
387 (1907)).
[T]he rule that statutes in derogation of common right are to be construed strictly
has some excuse in England where there are no constitutional restrictions. There it
is really another form of stating Blackstone's tenth rule, that interpretations which
produce collaterally absurd or mischievous consequences are to be avoided. In the
United States it means that interpretations which would make an act unconstitu-
tional are to be avoided, or else it is equivalent to Blackstone's tenth rule.
Id.
104. 1992 WL 345453 (Del. Ch. 1992).
105. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
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can be made. Nevertheless, Vice-Chancellor (now Justice) Jacobs re-
fused to extend this provision to mergers. Instead of using Warner's
close textual analysis, 10 6 Vice-Chancellor Jacobs leaned heavily on
the strict interpretive rule to find that the provision did not cover
mergers.'
0 7
In Delaware's most recent expression on this subject, Elliott As-
sociates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp.,10 8 the Supreme Court ruled that the
holders of preferred stock were entitled by the terms in the charter to
vote as a separate class. 10 9 The relevant provisions read as follows:
So long as any shares of First Series Preferred Stock remain out-
standing, the consent of the holders of at least two-thirds of the
shares of the First Series Preferred Stock outstanding at the time
(voting separately as a class. . . ) ... shall be necessary to permit,
effect or validate any one or more of the following:
(b) The amendment, alteration or repeal, whether by merger, con-
solidation or otherwise, of any of the provisions of the Restated
Certificate of Incorporation or of [the certificate of designations]
which would materially and adversely affect any right, preference,
privilege or voting power of the First Series Preferred Stock or of
the holders thereof .... 110
Although the Supreme Court was required to wind its way through
some rather technical arguments, it ultimately concluded that even
under an interpretive rule of strict construction, this provision allowed
106. Of course, Vice-Chancellor Jacobs.was not blind to the differences between the
provisions. He noted that the provision in Sullivan was "arguably distinguishable" from War-
ner because of the words "or otherwise." Id. at *3. Moreover, Vice-Chancellor Jacobs exam-
ined other provisions in the Certificate of Designations for evidence regarding the meaning of
"or otherwise," but he found that "[r]eading the Certificate in its entirety [did] not aid the
plaintiffs' construction." Id. at *5-*6.
107. Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote:
Although "or otherwise" could conceivably (a) mean a merger or (b) have no sub-
stantive meaning, an interpretation of the Certificate cannot rest upon such specula-
tive possibilities. For this and the other reasonsalready discussed, the analysis must
end where it began: by resort to the exacting burden that the plaintiffs must satisfy
for their position to prevail. "Under the rule of strict construction, any ambiguity
must be resolved against granting the challenged preferences, rights or powers." In
other words, "nothing should be presumed" in favor of preferences. "They ought to
be clearly expressed, if not by words of explicit import, then by necessary implica-
tion."
1992 WL 345453, at *7 (citations omitted).
108. 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998).
109. Id. at 851-52.
110. Id. at 845 (emphasis added by the court).
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for a class vote of the preferred stockholders."' The use of the word
"merger" clinched the deal:
The path for future drafters to follow in articulating class
vote provisions is clear. When a certificate (like the Warner cer-
tificate... ) grants only the right to vote on an amendment, altera-
tion or repeal, the preferred have no class vote in a merger. When
a certificate (like the First Series Preferred certificate here) adds
the terms "whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise" and a
merger results in an amendment, alteration or repeal that causes an
adverse effect on the preferred, there would be a class vote. 112
The Delaware courts are noted for instructing practicing law-
yers. 113 In this instance, they provided detailed guidance for creating
a class vote in a merger. It is worth noting, however, that the charter
at issue in Benchmark was drafted in September 2001--over three
years after the Avatex decision. This is not anomalous. The Delaware
courts have been warning preferred stockholders about rights strip-
ping transactions for generations, but the contract drafters continue to
make mistakes.
Although problems inevitably accompany the sort of formalism
employed by the Delaware courts, strict interpretation of contracts has
some substantial potential benefits, including the conservation of ju-
dicial resources 14 and the encouragement of ex ante bargaining.
Whether these benefits justify the costs is considered in Part V below.
IV. THE CONTRACT DOCTRINE OF GOOD FAITH
The contract doctrine of good faith rests on a simple empirical
observation: "Contracts are always more than the contract docu-
111. Id. at 853.
112. Id. at 855.
113. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009,1016 (1997)
Taken as a whole, the Delaware opinions can be understood as providing a set of
parables-instructive tales-of good managers and bad managers, of good lawyers
and bad lawyers, that, in combination, fill out the normative job description of these
critical players. My intuition is that we come much closer to understanding the role
of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as preachers than as police-
men.
Id.
114. This is similar to the classic argument in favor of strict liability in tort cases. See
J.C. Ver Steeg, Strict Liability and Judicial Resources, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1974).
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ment." ' 15 Despite widespread recognition that the express terms of
most bargains are incomplete, courts strive to anchor the duty of good
faith to those express terms.' 1 6  This means at least two things: (1)
courts generally will not change the express terms of the bargain to
conform to the court's notion of good faith" 17 and (2) courts apply the
duty of good faith to extend the express terms of the bargain only
when those terms somehow justify action.' 1 8 The scope of this latter
claim is the primary focus of attention for the voluminous commen-
115. Stewart Macaulay, The Real Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Rela-
tionships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 45
(2003). Macaulay proceeds with inimitable clarity to explain why this is so:
Words do not have a fixed meaning that every speaker of the language will
translate in the same way .... Also, it is very hard to bring the future to the present
and provide that X will happen if event Y takes place. Our ability to predict the fu-
ture is limited, and even careful business people often leave gaps in written con-
tracts .... Even when we can foresee that it is possible that something might hap-
pen, there are limits on the time that we can or should spend on trying to provide for
all contingencies in our contracts.
Furthermore, we must remember that business corporations are collections of
people and their activities are tightly coordinated. Those who negotiate the deal of-
ten are not the people who draft the written document recording it. Still others must
perform the contract. This opens the possibility that, for example, a firm's lawyers
may have different assumptions and expectations than its purchasing agents, sales
people, and engineers.
Strategy may be involved too. If I want a clause that says if event X takes
place, the consequence Y will follow, you may demand something in exchange that
I do not want to give you. When I anticipate this, it may be better to avoid raising
the issue in negotiations and hope that the matter can be resolved if event X ever
takes place.
Id. at 45-46.
116. Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the
IPIAntitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1848 (2003) (describing the duty of good faith
as a "backstop to explicit contractual terms").
117. See, e.g., Dave Greytak Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14,
23 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("[W]here the subject at issue is expressly covered by the contract, or
where the contract is intentionally silent as to that subject, the implied duty to perform in good
faith does not come into play."). The Delaware courts sometimes capture this idea by assert-
ing that they will not "rewrite" the contract. See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA L.P. v. Cincinnati
Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998) ("[I]t is not the proper role of a court to
rewrite or supply omitted provisions to a written agreement.").
118. While the challenged actions need not violate the express terms of the contract (see
PAMI-LEMB I Inc. v. EMB-NHC L.L.C., 857 A.2d 998, 1016 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("A party may
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing without violating an express term of
the contract")), they must violate the "spirit of the agreement" as extrapolated from the express
terms. Chamison v. HealthTrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 920 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff'd, 748 A.2d 407
(Del. 2000).
Even when one of the parties is granted discretion under the contract, the duty of good
faith limits the exercise of that discretion. Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del.
Ch. 1984), aff'd, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Wilmington Leasing, Inc. v. Parrish Leasing Co.,
L.P., No. Civ.A.15202, 1996 WL 560190, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1996).
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tary on the duty of good faith, l9 and it is the main issue that occupies
our attention here. We know from the discussion in Parts II and III
above that the Delaware courts use a strict interpretation of preferred
stock terms to demand complete contracts, and that in regard to class
votes for mergers, a complete contract exists only when the word
"merger" is specifically mentioned. In a nutshell, the Delaware courts
do not have room for the duty of good faith in cases like Benchmark.
This Part of this Article examines the duty of good faith and suggests
that it might have relevance to these cases.
The Delaware courts have embraced the conception of good faith
expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which "empha-
sizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party .... "120 That formulation
provides courts with ample discretion, while simultaneously attempt-
ing to link the duty of good faith to the actual bargain (note the neces-
sity of an "agreed common purpose" and "justified expectations"' 21).
The Restatement further qualifies this expansive obligation by "ex-
clud[ing] a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad
faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness
or reasonableness.', 122  This language embraces Robert Summers'
well-known conception of good faith as an "excluder," which holds
that good faith is best understood as the absence of bad faith. 12 3
Deciphering the content of any obligations that flow from the
119. See Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Ap-
proach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025, 1034 n.25
(2003) ("[M]ore than one hundred law review and bar journal articles have been written about
the implied duty of good faith in the past twenty years alone."). See also E. Allan Farnsworth,
Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201
(1968) [hereinafter Summers, "Good Faith "]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 369 (1980).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. Summers, "Good Faith, " supra note 119, at 201. This view has been rightly criti-
cized as indeterminate. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of
Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 71, 120 (1998) ("Professor Summers sees
no real meaning in good faith as such. Rather, he sees the concept as something of a safety-
valve, allowing the courts to police agreements and performance for fairness.").
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duty of good faith is tricky. 124 The Delaware courts often use the fa-
miliar thought experiment known as the "hypothetical bargain."'' 25 In
the well-known case of Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.,12 6 Chancellor Al-
len described the inquiry as follows:
Because it is an implied contractual obligation that is asserted as
the basis for the relief sought, the appropriate legal test is not diffi-
cult to deduce. It is this: is it clear from what was expressly
agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms of
the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later com-
plained of as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith-had
they thought to negotiate with respect to that matter. If the answer
to this question is yes, then, in my opinion, a court is justified in
concluding that such act constitutes a breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith. 1
27
For present purposes, the most interesting feature of the hypo-
thetical bargain, so expressed, is the implied assumption that contrac-
tual gaps are caused by a failure of imagination (had they thought to
negotiate with respect to that matter). 28  Even a moment's reflection
reveals that this is not the only source of incomplete contracts, 29 but
124. See Houh, supra note 119, at 1033 ("[A]lithough the concept of good faith is rela-
tively easy to grasp, the actual standard by which good faith or its absence is discerned can be
frustratingly elusive.").
125. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991) (giving detailed analysis and criticism of the
hypothetical bargain technique of contract interpretation).
126 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
127. Id. at 880; see also Mkt. St. Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th
Cir. 1991) (The implied duty of good faith "is a stab at approximating the terms the parties
would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise to their dis-
pute.").
128. Mkt. St. Assocs., 941 F.2d at 595.
129. Contracts may be incomplete in one of two ways: (1) the express terms of the con-
tract are ambiguous, or (2) the express terms of the contract do not cover the matter in ques-
tion. Charny, supra note 125, at 1816. Ambiguity might be addressed in various ways, and
the duty of good faith is sometimes employed to prevent a perverse interpretation of the ex-
press provisions of a contract. See, e.g., Chamison v. HealthTrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912 (Del.
Ch. 1999) ("[A] party to a contract has made an implied covenant to interpret and to act rea-
sonably upon contractual language that is on its face reasonable.") (citing Gilbert v. El Paso
Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("[I]f one party is given discretion in determining
whether [a] condition in fact has occurred[,] that party must use good faith in making that de-
termination."), aft'd, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990).
The second malady-commonly referred to as the problem of contractual "gaps" -may
have several causes: contracting parties may write contracts that are purposely incomplete,
contracting parties inevitably suffer from "bounded rationality" (they cannot foresee all poten-
tial problems), certain aspects of the relationship might be observable by the parties but not
verifiable by a court (e.g., the effort exerted by the parties), or transaction costs may make bar-
gaining prohibitively expensive. See Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies
and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REv. ECON. STUD. 83, 84-85 (1999) (arguing that transaction
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it seems to be the main focus in many Delaware cases, 130 and it will
suffice to illustrate the rationale for the duty of good faith in Delaware
jurisprudence.
Some insight into the rationale for the duty of good faith may lie
in the answer to this question: Why does the limited imagination of
contracting parties justify judicial intervention? The answer is far
from obvious. At the end of this Article's discussion of the strict in-
terpretation of preferred stock contracts, it was observed that there are
salutary effects of that approach, namely, the conservation of judicial
resources and the encouragement of ex ante bargaining. When courts
employ the duty of good faith to imply terms in incomplete contracts,
they forfeit those benefits.
On the other hand, judicial intervention might be useful in get-
ting the right answer. While one can safely assume that contract
drafters respond, in some degree, to the incentives imposed by a
commitment to judicial abstention, if contract drafters suffer from
bounded rationality, then limited imagination becomes a persistent
source of contractual incompleteness. Perhaps the application of the
duty of good faith is merely the recognition that contractual gaps are
an inevitable result of limited imagination.
This possibility creates something of a problem for the interpre-
tation of venture capital contracts. If the Delaware courts employ the
duty of good faith to most contracts because they are inherently in-
complete, why do the Delaware courts demand complete contracts for
preferred stockholders? The task of the next portion of this Article is
to explore whether this interpretive structure is a sensible way to ap-
proach venture capital contracts.
V. THE PROPER ROLE OF COURTS
The doctrine of independent legal significance is a rule of judi-
cial abstention, while the doctrine of good faith is a rule of judicial in-
tervention. In the face of contractual incompleteness, these two doc-
trines imply different roles for markets, legislatures, courts, and
norms. The doctrine of independent legal significance honors market
solutions-shaped in accord with legislative templates-while the
costs do not prevent complete contracting); but see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of
Incomplete Contracts, 66 REv. ECON. STuD. 115, 116 (1999).
130. See Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'Ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d
989, 992 (Del. 1998); DuPont v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996); Schwartzberg v.
CRITEF Assocs. L.P., 685 A.2d 365, 375-76 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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doctrine of good faith relies on judicial review of market activities
and judicial interpretation of the scope of legislation. Under both
doctrines, business norms are assumed to have some influence over
outcomes. Whether this allocation of judicial resources makes sense
depends not only on whether one institution or another has the capac-
ity for getting the answer right, but rather on a comparative institu-
tional analysis of all relevant institutions.
A framework and vocabulary for comparative institutional
analysis have been developed by Neil Komesar, who concentrates on
four institutions: courts, political processes, markets, and norms.'
31
These institutions are society's mediators. Simply stated, their task is
to resolve conflicts.
132
The goal of comparative institutional analysis is to define a role
for law, by which Komesar means "the adjudicative process." 133 In
comparing markets and courts, many policymakers and commentators
employ a single institutional framework that skews the analysis. For
example, by focusing on the characteristics of courts, commentators
have proposed judicial intervention where market solutions are supe-
rior or judicial abstention where the market is dysfunctional. 34 Al-
ternatively, by focusing on the shortcomings of the market, commen-
tators often argue for judicial intervention in areas where the courts
have little to offer.
Comparative institutional analysis is complicated by the fact that
institutional competencies are not static. Komesar identifies two at-
tributes of transactions that seem to influence the quality of institu-
tional performance most: the number of parties connected to the
transaction and the complexity of the transaction. 135  Importantly,
"[i]nstitutions tend to move together,"'136 and as numbers and com-
plexity increase, institutional competence declines across the board.
1 37
As a result, "analysis of law and rights will usually involve a series of
131. See, e.g., KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 27, at 31. Komesar uses the term
"informal communities" where I use "norms." Admittedly, communities are more than the
norms that they embrace, but those norms are the operative feature of communities in Kome-
sar's analysis. Id. at 27.
132. Id. at 31 ("Institutions for me are large-scale social decision-making processes-
markets, communities, political processes, and courts").
133. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 27, at 3.
134. As will become clear below, I place the doctrine of independent legal significance
in this latter category.
135. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 27, at 23.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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close institutional choices."'' 38
When faced with a conflict like Benchmark, the Delaware courts
have chosen the path of abstention through the doctrine of independ-
ent legal significance, rather than the path of intervention through the
doctrine of good faith. In doing so, they express a preference for the
outcome of ex ante bargaining over ex post judicial intervention. The
elephant in this room is the fact that all contracts are incomplete. If
the Delaware courts expect their "tough love" to induce complete
contracting, they are simply delusional. Benchmark is a case in point:
After decades of experience with rights stripping of preferred stock,
the courts still regularly hear cases in which "sophisticated" parties
leave themselves open to opportunistic behavior. The decision by the
Delaware courts to do nothing, therefore, is a decision to ignore the
reality of incomplete contracts.
Would a more realistic view of the contracting process necessar-
ily dictate judicial intervention through the doctrine of good faith?
Consider the following stylized hypothetical parties to a relational
contract bargain at a point in time. At some future point in time, the
parties discover a gap in their original agreement. One of the par-
ties-by virtue of having physical control over relationship assets or
some other real-world advantage--decides to act opportunistically
vis-d-vis the other party, who turns to the courts for assistance.
Should courts intervene in this dispute?
A single institutional analysis considers the costs of judicial in-
tervention and the likelihood that courts would generate the "right"
outcome in this case. A comparative institutional analysis, by con-
trast, considers not only the likely outcome of judicial intervention in
this case, but also the relative merits of judicial intervention as com-
pared to legislative action, ex ante or ex post bargaining, and the ef-
fect of "community" forces, such as norms and reputation. Moreover,
comparative institutional analysis must contemplate the implications
for other institutions of entrusting the decision to courts. For exam-
ple, one must consider whether judicial intervention would improve
bargaining.
In the context of the stylized facts discussed above, judicial in-
tervention at the future point in time (when the parties discover the
defect in the contract) has the salutary effect of moving the decision
point to a time when information about potential conflicts is more
readily available. Indeed, the relevant conflict has been exposed, thus
138. Id. at 24.
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creating an opportunity for judicial intervention. On the other hand,
we might have concerns that such intervention would override bar-
gaining. The concern is persistent in debates about the duty of good
faith, as it should be. 139 Nevertheless, the stylized facts assume an in-
advertent gap in the contract, suggesting that judicial intervention
would not do harm to a pre-existing bargain.
140
Judicial application of the duty of good faith also might benefit
ex post bargaining. In the absence of judicial intervention, the party
with the stronger position vis-d-vis the real-world assets at the center
of the dispute is likely to pursue its preferred path over the objections
of the weaker party. Meanwhile, the weaker party will look for exit
options, realizing the futility of appealing to the courts. In short, judi-
cial abstention enables opportunism. Judicial intervention, on the
other hand, disrupts the stronger party. The ensuing uncertainty
forces the stronger party to the bargaining table. 14' This result arises
regardless of judicial competence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem described above is part of a larger debate about the
proper role of good faith in contract law. In simplest terms, courts
could deal with the expectations of parties formally (i.e., inquiring
only about the plain meaning of the contract) or qualitatively (i.e., en-
forcing the presumed expectations of the parties, regardless of
whether those expectations are expressed in the contract). 42 While
no one seriously advocates a strict application of the "plain meaning"
approach to contract interpretation in all cases, the Delaware courts
have adhered fairly consistently to such a standard in cases involving
139. See, e.g., Robert M. Phillips, Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1179, 1199 (1993) (discussing the duty of good
faith in employment termination cases); Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract
Since the Emergence of the Modern Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 143
(1992) (referring to the duty of good faith as "a judicial doctrine... where fairness overrides
freedom of contract").
140. The stylized facts raise a new concern, however, about the legitimacy of judicial
intervention: If the parties have not bargained over the matter at issue, what standards will
guide the court in making determinations about the proper range of good faith behavior? As
noted above, the Delaware courts often attempt to ground their inquiry in a hypothetical bar-
gain, but this approach has been criticized on multiple fronts.
141. Cf Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 256 (1995) ("When parties bargain over [an] entitlement when there is private informa-
tion about value and harm, bargaining may be more efficient under a blurry balancing test than
under a certain rule.").
142. See Macaulay, supra note 115, at 44-45.
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the interpretation of preferred stock terms. This decision by the
Delaware courts prompts us to reconsider the proper role of courts in
interpreting venture capital contracts.
By imposing strict standards of contract interpretation, the
Delaware courts seem to be engaged in an effort to force contracting
parties toward completeness. As noted above, however, contracts are
inevitably incomplete. While the duty of good faith appears to re-
spond to this truism by filling gaps in contracts, the courts largely ig-
nore this duty in preferred stock cases. This omission, coupled with
the doctrine of independent legal significance-which treats charter
amendments via merger separately from charter amendments via
board and stockholder approval-virtually ensures that preferred
stockholders will be the subjects of opportunistic behavior by com-
mon stockholders.
Whether courts should respond to claims of injustice in this con-
text depends on comparative institutional analysis. Just because mar-
ket contracting produces incomplete contracts does not mean that
courts should be obligated to fill such contracts. On the other hand,
this Article suggests that the application of the duty of good faith in
this context might provide valuable incentives to renegotiate when
unexpected circumstances arise.
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